Moscow’s actions in Africa often fail to meet the continent’s development goals, presenting European leaders with an opportunity to counter Russian influence. However, they must remain vigilant about Russia’s alliances with the global south – and particularly initiatives such as BRICS.
Russia’s hosting of this year’s BRICS summit is an important opportunity for Moscow to showcase its international recognition in the face of Western isolation. Amid this changing global order, African countries are playing a prevalent role in Moscow’s attempt to forge new geopolitical and economic alliances, especially across the global south. This, in turn, has been triggering European anxieties about losing political and economic leverage in Africa.
While European policymakers and the Western media depict Russia as a formidable power winning the allegiance of African nations through malign activities, the reality is more complex and nuanced. In Africa, the viewpoints – from Mali to Ethiopia, from the Central African Republic to South Africa – oscillate between an inclination to leverage Russian interference as a means to reduce reliance on Western intervention, and reform the Western-dominated global political and financial systems; and scepticism towards the tangible benefits of Russia’s economic and military propositions.
As Europeans attempt to reset their damaged relations with Africa and regain leverage for geopolitical and geoeconomic ambitions, European policymakers should re-focus on the problem – and the solution. They should take advantage of Africa’s scepticism towards Russia and present the continent with a solid offer to fulfil aspirations for development and industrialisation. At the same time, European leaders should also acknowledge that the real ‘Russia problem’ in Africa is not Russia’s isolated actions, but rather Moscow’s adeptness at forging strategic alliances within the global south. Platforms such as BRICS amplify Russia’s otherwise more limited offer to Africa, and help forge new alliances in the face of a changing geopolitical order.
Reality check
Europeans have often overestimated Russia’s role in Africa, portraying it as a dominant player on par with China, Europe, and the United States. But the reality is somewhat different.
On one hand, Russia has effectively captured the attention of African governments and African citizens in practical ways, such as by tapping into anti-Western sentiments and strategically utilising its limited economic resources where the West has faltered: for example, the arms, minerals, and energy (most notably nuclear) sectors. Disinformation has also played a role in boosting Russia’s image and advancing its interests in the continent, although portraying the choice of many African leaders to engage with Russia as a mere byproduct of this is reductive. Instead, Russia uses flexible diplomacy to adapt its interests to a variety of democratic and authoritarian regimes. Another boom area for cooperation is resource-for-defence deals, where Moscow offers arms and security in exchange for natural resources. This allows both parties to navigate the constraints imposed by Western governments.
Russia also continues to demonstrate its growing geopolitical and geoeconomic interest in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2023, Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept dedicated an entire section on the region, elevating it to a strategic priority for the first time. Moscow sees untapped economic potential in its oil, gas, and nuclear energy resources, critical raw minerals, and agriculture sector – areas especially vital as Russia seeks new markets amid sanctions enforced by Western governments. Russia also recognises that successful strategic influence in sub-Saharan Africa could secure it political support, such as in the UN vote to condemn Russia’s aggression in Ukraine – or more recently at the Peace Summit for Ukraine, where only 14 African countries supported the final declaration. Furthermore, high-level engagements such as Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov’s tour of Africa, and the 2019 and 2023 Russia-Africa summits, reflect Russia’s ambitions to be seen as a significant international partner alongside global powers such as the US.
However, beyond Russia’s high-profile political gestures and presence in strategic sectors, Moscow faces challenges in Africa. In the Sahel, overstretched military resources and financial strains exacerbated by the ongoing war in Ukraine are undermining its effectiveness in the region. Russia’s economic role in Africa also remains underwhelming – although trade between the two more than doubled in 10 years to reach $24.6 billion in 2023, this remains a fraction of Africa’s overall trade with the European Union ($288), China ($262 billion), India ($103 billion), and Turkey ($40 billion). Russian foreign direct investment contributes just 1 per cent of Africa’s total and lacks the scale to finance any large infrastructure, nuclear, or mining projects.
As such, Russia’s high-profile deals and agreements do not have sufficient financial clout to deliver long-term development or foster industrialisation. Such interactions seem to be primarily focused on advancing Moscow’s geopolitical interests and Russia’s limited capacity to deliver is sparking growing scepticism regarding whether Moscow can transition from funding short-term, self-serving projects to instead meeting Africa’s demand for deeper, more tangible economic partnerships. As African nations advocate for wider industrialisation and sustainable value creation, for example banning the export of raw materials to encourage local value addition, Russia should demonstrate that it can offer the kind of sustainable partnerships sought by African nations.
Bandwagon of influence
Moscow’s influence in Africa is not dependant on impressive trade or investment figures; but rather its ability to tap into rising frustration in the global south over continued global Western hegemony
One pivotal factor that could enable Russia to exert greater influence in Africa is stronger geopolitical alignment with southern partners, such as the BRICS nations. Clearly, Moscow’s influence in Africa is not dependant on impressive trade or investment figures; but rather its ability to tap into rising frustration in the global south over continued global Western hegemony. For this strategy to work, Russia needs partners like the BRICS group, which offers Moscow a lifeline amid Western sanctions by providing access to new markets and a platform from which it can amplify alternative narratives.
The burgeoning discussion around trading in local currencies beyond the US dollar is a good example. By collaborating with BRICS to advocate for local currency trading, Russia and its trading partners could potentially mitigate the risks associated with Russia’s removal from the Swift payment system: while the long-term viability of this approach is unclear, it is one of BRICS’ most promising tools to create parallel financial systems, counter the impacts of sanctions, maintain Russia’s presence in global trade, diminish the influence of the dollar, and amplify Russian influence in Africa. Undoubtedly, if successful, this would challenge the long-standing financial and trade norms that have long favoured Western powers and determined the global order.
The Russia challenge in Africa
To counter Russian tactics which seek to strengthen its influence in the global south, European leaders must re-focus their understanding of Russia’s influence in Africa. This necessitates viewing Moscow’s actions through the prism of Africa’s overall needs and in relation to the global south.
European policymakers especially need to direct their efforts along three key lines:
- Highlight positive narratives, not just competitors: European leaders should pivot away, at least publicly, from fixating on the negative actions of rivals like Russia. This approach is unlikely to resonate with African nations, which are increasingly adopting a multipolar mindset, eager to maximise their political and economic benefits. European players should instead emphasise their own track record of job creation, skill development, and regulatory improvements to foster a stable investment environment – essential prerequisites for Africa to fulfil its ambitions and climb up the value chain.
- Fill the gaps:As Europe’s presence in Africa dwindles, other countries – such as China, Russia, and the UAE – have filled the void. By expanding trade and offering sustained and large-scale investment, Europe could re-occupy critical spaces and plug the gaps left by other entities. This would satisfy Africa’s growth expectations and allow Europe to regain a more influential position on the continent.
- ‘Break down’ the global south:The EU and member states should seek to engage more pragmatically with the global south. Instead of viewing it as an ideologically unified and antagonistic bloc, they should build tailored relationships with individual countries where sufficient common ground exists. For example, collaborating with the UAE in expanding energy access in Africa presents a valuable opportunity for Europe to move away from bloc-thinking and temper coalition-building among global south actors on key international issues which could be potentially detrimental to European interests.
As the ongoing BRICS summit highlights Russia’s efforts to reshape global dynamics and the group pushes for greater influence across the global south, Europe must implement strategies to recalibrate its position in Africa. By addressing Africa’s development and industrial ambitions, and offering more fluid partnerships with global south players, Europe can counterbalance the growing global south polarity that BRICS is championing. Such intervention would underscore Europe’s more proactive role in navigating the current multipolar world and reshaping its relationship with Africa – which might otherwise be threatened by further consolidation of Western-free alliances.
